


# Smart Card and TPM DNSSEC PKCS11 Training and HowTo

Richard Lamb 20120927



## We have 5 demo examples:

- [Offline Smart Card KSK + Online software ZSKs](#)
- [Offline HSM KSK + Online software ZSKs using fake HSM](#)
- [Offline Smart Card KSK + Online Smart Card ZSKs](#)
- [Online Smart Card KSK + ZSKs + BIND 9.9 in-line signing](#)
- [Online TPM KSK + ZSKs + BIND 9.9 in-line signing](#)

Note: The PKCS11 standard allows for a simplified upgrade path to HSMs. Smartcards and TPMs do on the order of 1 1024 RSA signature per second while an HSM can do greater than 1000/s. Although key backup and initialization strategies vary across devices, the C\_Sign function call to generate RSA signatures is consistent across all. The examples on the demo DVD use BIND 9.9 tools with the modification of one file - bind/lib/dns/opensslrsa\_link.c - to natively support PKCS11. The modified single bind-9.9.1-P2 [file](#) and the rest of the source is on the DVD.

For smart cards:

- get a USB smartcard reader ([SCR331](#) \$15)
- get a smartcard ([Aventra](#) \$11)
- boot DVD and login as root password dnssec (900M ISO file for complete bootable Smartcard and TPM DVD [here](#))
- plug in reader and insert smartcard. (card reader light, if it has one, should blink indicating pcsd daemon has recognized the card)

Note: If not using the Aventra MyEID PKI smart card 2012, replace PKCS11\_LIBRARY\_PATH="/opt/dccom/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so" with different pkcs11 library in various scripts such as the ones below. I have tried [Athena SCS IDProtect LASER](#), [Feitian PKI](#), and a few other cards and unfortunately each card vendor have very different techniques for initializing and formatting cards so all the routines will have to be customized for each vendor. The Aventra cards are easy to purchase in small quantities. However, the smallest vendor change (e.g., ATR,..) can render the OpenSC PKCS11 driver useless (this is a case in favor of proprietary driver+card like Athena SCS). So there is no guarantee that this setup will work if any element is changed.

- carderase
- cardrng
- cardsign
- genksk-sc
- genzsk-sc
- signem-sc
- signzone-99

Routines that also depend on Aventura card:

- carddel
- carderase
- cardshow
- cardwrite

## Offline Smart Card KSK + Online software ZSKs

- carderase\* (Use 123456 for PIN and Security Officer PIN if asked)
- export DOMAIN=yourdomain (not ending dot)
- optional: export TEST="yes" (short signature times for testing)
- cardrng (in a second terminal window. PIN from above. If you want to now test the RNG, in another window do "cat /dev/random | rngtest", wait a minute, and then ctrl-C. rngtest should return some stats.)
- genzsk
- genzsk (filename like "temp")
- Stop cardrng and exit out of window
- cardwrite (CKA\_LABEL like "Kdate", filename and PIN from above.)
- optional: insert another card, carderase, cardwrite to create KSK backup
- cardshow
- cardsign (Use "abc" for passphrase to encrypt keybundles, KSK CKA\_LABEL and PIN from above)
- optional: signzone (Use "abc" for passphrase for keybundles. starts local nameserver and runs sample signer process to maintain signatures)

\* If using [Feitian PKI](#) card, use "carderase-ft" instead of "carderase". The rest of the instructions remain the same.

See the contents of various comands found in /opt/dccom and output in demo directory /tmp/namedb for details (e.g., signemd.out). "signemd" will automatically maintain the signed zone using software ZSKs and KSK signed DNSKEY RRsets created by "cardsign" above. This parallels the pre-generated DNSKEY RRset approach used at the root. For security, do not place all pre-signed RRsets on the online signer machine.

Here is a sample [DPS](#) and Key Ceremony [documentation](#) corresponding to this demo. Other training material can be found [here](#)

Doing "dig +dnssec -t soa yourdomain @127.0.0.1" should show you the signed zone SOA as it automatically gets updated.

If you would like a persistent demo, run "startx" from root prompt and use "install" icon from desktop. Study signzone and create own startup script, separating out key generation (to maintain separately), changing the /tmp directory to something more appropriate, and configuring a system to get unsigned zone updates. Your startup script "startup" might look like:

```
export PKCS11_LIBRARY_PATH="/opt/dccom/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so"
read -s -p "HSM PIN: " PKCS11_LIBRARY_PIN
echo ""
export PKCS11_LIBRARY_PIN
cd /tmp/namedb
/opt/dccom/signemd yourdomain
/opt/dccom/named -c /tmp/namedb/named.conf
```

## Offline HSM KSK + Online software ZSKs using fake HSM

Follow exactly same steps as previous example but add "-n" to each command, e.g., "carderase-n" instead of "carderase"...and of course you do not have a second optional card. This example uses the software token that is included in the opencryptoki package. If you are curious, the demo key material is kept in /var/lib/opencryptoki/swtok.

## Offline Smart Card KSK + Online Smart Card ZSKs

- carderase\* (Use 123456 for PIN and Security Officer PIN if asked)
- export DOMAIN=yourdomain (not ending dot)
- optional: export TEST="yes" (short signature times for testing)
- genzsk-sc (PIN from above.)
- genksk-sc (PIN from above.)
- cardsign-sc (KSK CKA\_LABEL is what genksk-sc returned at the end, e.g., Kyourdomain.+008+17118. PIN from above)
- optional: signzone-sc (PIN from above. Starts local nameserver and runs sample signer process to maintain signatures.)

\* If using Feitian PKI card, use "carderase-ft" instead of "carderase". The rest of the instructions remain the same.

See the contents of various commands found in /opt/dccom and output in demo directory /tmp/namedb for details (e.g., signemd-sc.out). "signemd-sc" will automatically maintain the signed zone using smartcard ZSKs and KSK signed DNSKEY RRsets created by "cardsign-sc" above. This parallels the pre-generated DNSKEY RRset approach used at the root. For security, do not place all pre-signed RRsets on the online signer machine. Since the keys are generated inside the cards and most cards do not support key export, there is no backup.

Doing "dig +dnssec -t soa yourdomain @127.0.0.1" should show you the signed zone SOA as it automatically gets updated.

If you would like a persistent demo, run "startx" from root prompt and use "install" icon from desktop. Study signzone-sc and create own startup script, separating out key generation (to maintain separately), changing the /tmp directory to something more appropriate, and configuring a system to get unsigned zone updates. Your startup script "startup" might look like:

```
export PKCS11_LIBRARY_PATH="/opt/dccom/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so"
read -s -p "HSM PIN: " PKCS11_LIBRARY_PIN
echo ""
export PKCS11_LIBRARY_PIN
cd /tmp/namedb
/opt/dccom/signemd-sc yourdomain
/opt/dccom/named -c /tmp/namedb/named.conf
```

## Online Smart Card KSK + ZSKs + BIND 9.9 in-line signing

- carderase\* (Use 123456 for PIN and Security Officer PIN if asked)
- export DOMAIN=yourdomain (not ending dot)
- optional: export TEST="yes" (short signature times for testing)

- signzone-99 (PIN = 123456 from above. Generates KSK, ZSK, starts local nameserver as automated in-line signer)
- optional: monitor (a simple script using "dig" to periodically display RRSIG key tags)

\* If using Feitian PKI card, use "carderase-ft" instead of "carderase". The rest of the instructions remain the same.

See the contents of /opt/dccom/signzone-99 and demo directory /tmp/namedb for details (e.g., /tmp/namedb/log/runlog). "named" with /tmp/namedb/named.conf will automatically maintain the signed zone using KSK and ZSK in the smartcard. An excellent BIND 9.9 basic example using software keys is [here](#).

Doing "dig +dnssec -t soa yourdomain @127.0.0.1" should show you the signed zone SOA as it automatically gets updated. The "Activate:" field in the keys/\*.private files indicates when named will start using the corresponding key. The SOA serial should increment then. "rndc signing -list yourdomain" shows signing status. "rndc sign yourdomain" forces a recalculation of signatures. For a key rollover, you can manually add and remove keys from the "keys/" directory after a new key has been introduced and published or could use the "Activate:" and other meta fields to effect a complete rollover.

If you would like a persistent demo, run "startx" from root prompt and use "install" icon from desktop. Study signzone-sc and create own startup script, separating out key generation (to maintain separately), changing the /tmp directory to something more appropriate, and configuring a system to get unsigned zone updates. Your startup script "startup" might look like:

```
export PKCS11_LIBRARY_PATH="/opt/dccom/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so"
read -s -p "HSM PIN: " PKCS11_LIBRARY_PIN
echo ""
export PKCS11_LIBRARY_PIN
/opt/dccom/named -c /tmp/namedb/named.conf
```

## TPM Work

For TPM demo:

- get a machine that has a TPM. Newer ones are better than older ones.
- make sure no apps are relying on it (e.g., Bitlocker, etc...)

Note: trousers, opencrptoki, tpm-tools are very finicky and building a local version for debugging requires pulling in a lot of cruft. Opencryptoki is a moving target but version 2.4 seems to have attained some stability but beware of old TPM systems that will fail after a few thousand executions of PKCS11 C\_Sign. [This](#) is an excellent description of how opencryptoki implements PKCS11 using a TPM and how keys can be backed up.


Versions for this demo on Centos 6.0:

```
tpm-tools-1.3.4-2.el6.i686.rpm
tpm-tools-pkcs11-1.3.4-2.el6.i686.rpm
opencryptoki-2.4.2-2.el6.i686.rpm
opencryptoki-libs-2.4.2-2.el6.i686.rpm
trousers-0.3.4-4.el6.i686.rpm
```


## Online TPM KSK + ZSKs + BIND 9.9 in-line signing

- REBOOT MACHINE AND GO TO BIOS TO ACTIVATE AND CLEAR TPM FIRST.




Sample BIOS screens for a Dell 755:




Make sure "TPM Security" is "ON".





CLEAR the TPM. CAUTION: any prior applications depending on the TPM will fail.







Make sure the TPM is still "Activated"




Exit BIOS.



- Boot from DVD.  
DVD boot screens:



Just tab to "Quit" and ENTER



- Login as "root" password "dnssec"
- /etc/init.d/tcsd start (should return "OK")
- tpm\_version (should return TPM info)
- optional: tpm\_createek (this may not need to be done unless the TPM has never been initialized)
- tpm\_takeownership (CR for all prompts. This will take a while generating 2048 bit SRK on the TPM. Try again or go through BIOS TPM CLEAR and ACTIVATE process again if an I/O error occurs.)
- tpm\_restrictsrk -a (CR for password. For TPM error messages, see /var/log/messages)
- /etc/init.d/pkcsstotd start (should return "OK". You may have to "rm -rf /var/lib/opencryotoki/tpm" if this is not off the live dvd to clear out prior session setup. This is where encrypted keys will reside.)
- tpmtoken\_init -l debug (Use 123456 for Security Officer and USER in this example. Note: do not use 87654321 for SO or 12345678 for USER. This will take a while while 2048 bit SO and USER storage keys are generated)
- pkcsconf -t (to display results. Token #0 should show that it has been initialized, e.g., "Flags: 0x44D (RNG|LOGIN\_REQUIRED|USER\_PIN\_INITIALIZED|CLOCK\_ON\_TOKEN|TOKEN\_INITIALIZED)")
- export DOMAIN=yourdomain (no ending dot)
- optional: export TEST="yes" (short signature times for testing)
- signzone-tpm (PIN = 123456 from above. This will take a while. enerates KSK, ZSK, starts local nameserver as automated in-line signer)
- optional: monitor (a simple script using "dig" to periodically display RRSIG key tags)

See the contents of /opt/dcom/signzone-tpm and demo directory /tmp/namedb for details (e.g., /tmp/namedb/log/runlog and look for "C\_Sign" messages indicating PKCS11/TPM use). "named" with /tmp/namedb/named.conf will automatically maintain the signed zone using keys in /var/lib/opencryotoki/tpm/root protected by the TPM SRK.

Doing "dig +dnssec -t soa yourdomain @127.0.0.1" should show you the signed zone SOA as it automatically gets updated. The "Activate:" field in the keys/\*.private files indicates when named will start using the corresponding key. The SOA serial should increment then. "rndc signing -list yourdomain" shows signing status. "rndc sign yourdomain" forces a recalculation of signatures. For a key rollover, you can manually add and remove keys from the "keys/" directory after a new key has been introduced and published and use the "Activate:" and other meta fields to effect a complete rollover. There should be plenty of BIND 9.9 documentation on how to do this.

Yes...since the demo DVD always starts fresh you need to CLEAR the TPM each time. Alternatively you may elect to install the LiveDVD onto a blank drive (or flash drive)\* so that data structures created by "tpm\_takeownership" are maintained across re-boots.

\*Run "startx" from root prompt and use "install" icon from desktop. Before rebooting the new system, CLEAR and ACTIVATE TPM again and follow instructions from above:

- use BIOS to CLEAR and ACTIVATE TPM

- boot newly installed system.
- login as "root" password "dnssec"
- /etc/init.d/tcsd start
- tpm\_version
- tpm\_takeownership
- tpm\_restrictsrk -a
- rm -rf /var/lib/opencryotoki/tpm
- /etc/init.d/pkcsslotd start
- tpmtoken\_init -l debug
- export DOMAIN=yourdomain
- optional: export TEST="YES"
- signzone-tpm Study signzone-tpm and create own startup script, separating out key generation (to run separately), changing the /tmp directory to something more appropriate, and configuring a system to get unsigned zone updates. Your startup script might look like:

```
export PKCS11_LIBRARY_PATH="/usr/lib/opencryotoki/libopencryotoki.so"
read -s -p "HSM PIN: " PKCS11_LIBRARY_PIN
echo ""
export PKCS11_LIBRARY_PIN
/etc/init.d/tcsd start
/etc/init.d/pkcsslotd start
# keep /dev/random full
nohup /opt/dccom/pkcs11-backup -S 0 -r -1:- >/dev/null 2>&1 &
/opt/dccom/named -c /tmp/namedb/named.conf
```

- done

**END**