Some of Dr. Richard Lamb's Technical Contributions at ICANN

 With help from NSRC developed my own teaching kit and material over the years (since 2011). Transitioned from FBSD jails to 90 LXC VMs under Ubuntu. Complete standalone signed root dnssec system and routing infrastructure that fits in a backpack. Under continual improvement to track events. E.g. http://dnssec-deployment.icann.org/training/SGN/



DNS/DNSSEC Hands-On Training APNIC 2017 Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam

This is a 5-day, hands-on workshop. The participants will: Learn to design, deploy, and operate authoritative and recursive DNS architectures Understand the risks surrounding the DNS, and the role of DNSSEC (DNS security extensions) Learn how to deploy DNSSEC, including zone signature and key management Learn about secure registry operations, monitoring and practices.

Workshop Requirements:

Some understanding of DNS and netowrk basics Some knowledge of Linux/UNIX command line Participants need to bring a computer that can acess WiFi and capable of running "ssh". Tablet computers will not work.

DNS/DNSSEC/NMM Workshop Agenda


Schedule

Session 1	0900-1030
Break	
Session 2	1100-1230
Lunch	
Session 3	1400-1530
Break	
Session 4	1600-1730

Instructors

Name	Email	Organization
Nguyen Trung Kien	Nguyen Trung Kien(at)vnnic.vn	VN NIC
Champika Wijayatunga	ayatunga champika.wijayatunga(at)icann.org	
Richard Lamb richard.lamb(at)icann.org		ICANN


______ classroom network




 Designed/Built/Deployed and maintain multiple root DNSSEC KSK rollover sites in 2015 specially designed to accelerate testing of root KSK rollover using RFC5011. Complete copy of root including PKI signed XML anchors. E.g., <u>https://www.toot-servers.net/root7/</u>

https://icksk.dnssek.info/fauxroot.html

Test minimal root zone with continually rolling KSK and ZSKs (Schedule) Slightly delayed KSK roll and no missing key Extended Rickroll Final



3. Running public test validating resolver Windows Server, Ubuntu, and BIND systems for above.



 Design/Built/Deployed free ccTLD DNSSEC HSM based signing system complete with all documents, key ceremonies, rollover tools, and registrar key transition checklists. Operating since 2011 at PCH. Serves many ccTLDs. E.g., <u>https://www.pch.net/resources/Papers/tld-dnssec-platform/tld-dnssecplatform.pdf</u>



5. Advise and work with cryptech (open hardware security module) effort from prior to ICANN funding. Am responsible for design/build/test tamper detection system.



6. With help from NIC.BR built in 2FA system for class Registrar / Registry system to demonstrate importance and simplicity of 2FA security. Shared code with various participants. (ref recent Brazil bank issue)



The Root Management





7. Since 2008 added smartcard support into industry standard nameserver BIND. Initially with patches to BIND (that were submitted). Then as with special PKCS11 shim driver that would work with any HSM/smartcard. Led to successfully convincing ISC to support after demonstrating at last IETF Hackathon. E.g., https://www.ietf.org/registration/MeetingWiki/wiki/doku.php?id=96hackathon

DNS/DNSSEC/DPRIVE/DANE


- Champion(s)
 - Dan York Wyork@isoc.org
 Allison Mankin
 - Sara Dickinson
 - Melinda Shore Willem Toorop
 - Tim Wicinski
- Rick Lamb
- Project(s)
- Applications that use DNSSEC, DANE and DNS privacy via getdns (Python, node, is, or C)
- = TLS and DNS interfaces, including but not limited to the TLS DNS chain extension · Completion and interop of edns keep-alive implementations (getdns, unbound, others) and testing of connection management by
- servers = RFC 5011 implementation and testing in getdns
- GUniversal Acceptance review of getdns
 Continued work on other projects from Hackathon 95
- Make BIND work with smartcards without patches (Rick Lamb)
 I've had this site for some time Shttp://ri.co.cr/ and many are using its contents for their own DNSSEC deployments (including a CCTLD or two). Problem is BIND currently must be patched to support this (originally 2008) mod. Every time BIND gets updated surgery needs to be done to make the patch work again. The solution I am offering is to write a PKCS11 intermediate driver that BIND can use in NATIVE PKCS11 mode to use any smartcards OpenSC supports. Initial tries show promise. At the Hackathon I would like to press this to the next step and publish.

8. Published results of using smartcards as an alternative to HSMs for DNSSEC research. Resulting in release of bootable DVDs and complete key ceremony scripts and other documentation. Popular with ccTLDs and used by NIC.CR and others. E.g., http://ri.co.cr/




We have 5 demo examples:

- Offline Smart Card KSK + Online software ZSKs
 Offline HSM KSK + Online software ZSKs using fake HSM
 Offline Smart Card KSK + Online Smart Card ZSKs
 Online Smart Card KSK + ZSKs + BIND 9.9 in-line signing
 Online TPM KSK + ZSKs + BIND 9.9 in-line signing
- 9. Designed/Built/Deployed and maintain DNSSECSTAT since 2010. Referenced and relied on by IGF, ISOC and community since 2010. E.g., https://rick.eng.br/dnssecstat/ (also organized and ran an IGF




10. Designed/Built/Deployed and maintain TLD Early Warning System in 2010. Auto email warnings. Used often to notify ccTLDs of (impending) failure. E.g., http://www.dnssek.info/



DNSSEC EARLY WARNING SYSTEM (DEWS) - Thu Apr 13 01:59:05 UTC 2017

11. Designed/Built/Deployed and maintain SMIME-DNSSEC email auto-responder to encourage deployment of the next killer app:email e.g., smimea@zx.com



12. Built system to support CDS experimentation in support of interesting opportunity to simplify and further secure the DNS with DNSSEC.

13. Web site to generate DNSSEC DANE TLSA records to support TLSA deployment. E.g., https://www.co.tt/tlsa4www.cgi



TLSA4WWW

Calculate TL	SA for Web Site
Version 0.01.	
web site FQDN:	
	Calculate
Date: 13-APR-2017	05:10 UTC

14. Web site to generate DNSSEC DS records to support DNSSEC deployment.





DS4DN


Calculate DS for Version 0.01.	Domain Name
Domain Name: [OPT]Nameserver:	
	Calculate

Date: 13-APR-2017 05:12 UTC

- 15. Web site showing daily updated stats on TLD DNSSEC validity period, key sizes, algorithm to help in deployment decisions. E.g., https://www.co.tt/dnssec_scan_val.html
- 16. Built and maintain list of Registrars supporting DNSSEC (2010). E.g.,

https://www.icanr	n.org/reso	urces/pages/deploymen	it-2012-02-25-en
Resources	Deploying DNSSEC		
 About ICANN 	Registrars that support end user DNSSEC management, including entry of DS records		
 Learning 	Last updated: 20 May 2016		
 Participate 			
President's Corner	Registrar	Accepts DS records for	Notes
ICANN Management Organization Chart	123domain.eu	.com .net .org .at .be .ch .cz .de .eu .fr .li .lu	(1) (2)
Staff	(DE) .me .s	.me .se	
Careers	AB Name ISP (SE)	.be .biz .com .eu .net .org .se .us	(1) (2)
 In Focus 			112 (SUDALASSA)
Continuity	BigRock (IN)	.com .in .me .net .org	(2) More info at
 DNSSEC 			http://manage.bigrock.in/kb/answer/1907
Standards	SSEC Root Binero (SE) .se .eu	All domains are automatically signed. (1)	
IANA DNSSEC Root Information			(2)
TLD DNSSEC Report	BIT B.V. (NL)	.com .net .org .nl .be .de .eu .info .biz	(1) (DS via email)
Root Deployment	CPS-	.at .biz .ch .com .de .eu .info .li .net .org	
Registrar Deployment	Datensysteme GmbH (DE)		
Deployment Map	CSC	.com .net org .uk .biz .com.au .net.au .us	
Deployment Graph	Corporate	eu be se co	

17. Guided by Dave P, built system to track badness in new nTLDs registrations based on blocklists and whois data. E.g. (one of many) <u>https://www.co.tt/badregs/</u>



18. Designed/Built/Deployed and maintain all KSK root software (still!) and test routines. Also created and instituted the TCR approach to ensure trust in a multi-stakeholder environment. Architected whole root KSK system down to safe selection and key ceremonies. Pushing PTI to reduce risk by funding other avenues.

-			
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Madel Accurerid: AEP Networks			
Serial: H1403032			
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SKR In Expirat 22100:00.0			

- 19. Designed/Built/Deployed and maintained live Root DNSSEC testbed that was anycasted and used by large ISP for testing. (2008)
- 20. Numerous direct engineering assistance to ccTLDs including NP TZ CR ...