

# DNSSEC for the Root Zone

NANOG 48 Austin, TX  
February 2010

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This design is the result of a cooperation  
between ICANN & VeriSign with  
support from the U.S. DoC NTIA

# Roles and Responsibilities

# ICANN

## IANA Functions Operator

- Manages the Key Signing Key (KSK)
- Accepts DS records from TLD operators
- Verifies and processes request
- Sends update requests to DoC for authorization and to VeriSign for implementation

# DoC NTIA


U.S. Department of Commerce  
National Telecommunications and Information Administration

- Authorizes changes to the root zone
  - ▶ DS records
  - ▶ Key Signing Keys
  - ▶ DNSSEC update requests follow the same process as other changes
- Checks that ICANN has followed their agreed upon verification/processing policies and procedures

# VeriSign

## Root Zone Maintainer

- Manages the Zone Signing Key (ZSK)
- Incorporates NTIA-authorized changes
- Signs the root zone with the ZSK
- Distributes the signed zone to the root server operators



# Deployment

# Goals

- Deploy a signed root zone
  - ▶ Transparent processes
  - ▶ Audited procedures
  - ▶ DNSSEC deployment
    - validators, registries, registrars, name server operators
- Communicate early and often!

# Anticipated Issues

# DO=1

- A significant proportion of DNS clients send queries with EDNS0 and DO=1
- Some (largely unquantified, but potentially significant) population of such clients are unable to receive large responses
- Serving signed responses might break those clients

# Rollback

- If we sign the root, there will be some early validator deployment
- There is the potential for some clients to break, perhaps badly enough that we need to un-sign the root (e.g., see previous slide)
- Un-signing the root will break the DNS for validators

# Staged Deployment

# Deploy Incrementally

- The goal is to leave the client population with some root servers not offering large responses until the impact of those large responses is better understood
- Relies upon resolvers not always choosing a single server

# DURZ

- Deploy conservatively
  - ▶ It is the root zone, after all
- Prevent a community of validators from forming
  - ▶ This allows us to unsign the root zone during the deployment phase (if we have) to without collateral damage

# DURZ

- “Deliberately Unvalidatable Root Zone”
- Sign RRSets with keys that are not published in the zone (but with matching keytag...)
- Publish keys in the zone which are not used, and which additionally contain advice for operators (see next slide)
- Swap in actual signing keys (which enables validation) at the end of the deployment process

# DURZ

```
.      3600      IN      DNSKEY  257  3  5  (  
      AwEAAa++++  
      ++THIS/KEY/AN/INVALID/KEY/AND/SHOULD  
      /NOT/BE/USED/CONTACT/ROOTSIGN/AT/ICA  
      NN/DOT/ORG/FOR/MORE/INFORMATION++++  
      +++++  
      +++++  
      +++++  
      +++++  
      +++++  
      +++++  
      +++++  
      +++++  
      ) ; Key ID = 6477
```

# Deploy Incrementally

L	Completed on 27 January
A	Completed on 10 February
M, I	March 3rd
D, K, E	March 22nd
B, H, C, G, F	April 12th
J	May 5th

# Measurement

- For those root servers that are instrumented, full packet captures and subsequent analysis around signing events
- Ongoing dialogue with operator communities to assess real-world impact of changes

# Testing

- A prerequisite for this proposal is a captive test of the deployment
  - ▶ Test widely-deployed resolvers, with validation enabled and disabled, against the DURZ
  - ▶ Test with clients behind broken networks that drop large responses

# Interaction with TLDs

# DS Change Requests

- Approach likely to be based on existing methods for TLD managers to request changes in root zone
- Anticipate being able to accept DS requests 1-2 months before the validatable signed root zone is in production
- Current topic of discussion within Root DNSSEC Design Team

# Communication

# Project Web Page

- <http://www.root-dnssec.org>
  - ▶ Status updates
  - ▶ Documents
  - ▶ Presentation Archive
  - ▶ Small collection of links to relevant tools
  - ▶ Contact information
  - ▶ RSS

# Communication

with non-technical audiences

- Will reach the non-technical and semi-technical audiences with press releases and other means.
- PR departments with people who know how to do this will be engaged.

# Communication

with technical audiences

- Reaching the technical audiences via mailing lists and other means
  - ▶ IETF DNS lists (e.g. DNSOP)
  - ▶ non-IETF DNS lists (e.g. DNS-OARC)
  - ▶ General operator lists (e.g. NANOG)
  - ▶ ...

# Draft Timeline

- December 1, 2009
  - ▶ **Root zone signed**
    - Initially signed zone stays internal to ICANN and VeriSign
  - ▶ ICANN and VeriSign begin KSR processing
    - ZSK and KSK rolls
- January - July 2010
  - ▶ Incremental roll out of signed root
- July 1, 2010
  - ▶ KSK rolled and trust anchor published
  - ▶ **Signed root fully deployed**

# Deployment Status

24 February 2010

# Documentation

- Requirements document posted
- High-Level Architecture, Policy and Practice Statements, Trust Anchor Publication, Deployment documents posted in draft form
- Ceremony, KSK Facility Requirements, Testing documents expected to be posted soon

<http://www.root-dnssec.org>

# Testing

- Data collection testing by Root Server Operators complete - have now done this for real
- Several KSR/SKR exchanges complete
- DURZ vs. Resolver testing complete

# DURZ Roll-Out

- L and A root servers are running the DURZ
- M and I will make the transition next week.

# Other zones

ARPA, IN-ADDR.ARPA, IP6.ARPA

Work on how to sign these zones is happening and reasonable progress is expected.

# Thoughts?

- Feedback is extremely welcome
  - ▶ Email to [rootsign@icann.org](mailto:rootsign@icann.org)

# Root DNSSEC Design Team

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