Manual Key Rollover Exercise
----------------------------

OBJECTIVE

We are going to roll the ZSK for the zones we have just signed.

PLEASE make note of the KSK/ZSK IDs and write them down on a piece 
of paper as you work to remember which is which.

REMINDERS

 - we are keeping our keys in /etc/bind/keys/

 - we currently have two pairs of keys in that directory, one ZSK 
   and one KSK.
   Each pair is represented by two files, one ending in ".key" (the
   public key) and one ending in ".private" (the private key)

 - there is a DS RRSet in the "root" zone corresponding to our KSK


ZSK ROLLOVER

1. Take a look at what keys we have already generated. Make a note
of the names of the files containing the current ZSK and KSK.

  # cd /etc/bind/keys/
  # ls -lt K*

2. Generate a new ZSK, which we will use to replace the old one.

  # dnssec-keygen -r /dev/urandom -a RSASHA256 -b 2048 -n ZONE MYTLD
                (replacing MYTLD with the name of your zone)
		(Elliptic: replace "-a RSASHA256 -b 2048" with "-a ECDSAP384SHA384")

  Which might output:

  KMYTLD.+008+45000

Make sure all the keyfiles are readable by the named process:

  # chown bind K*
  # chmod u+r K*
  # ls -lt

You should now have a third key pair in the directory. If you check the
DNSKEY RDATA (e.g., "cat KMYTLD.+008+45000.key"), you should see the 
flags field is 256 (i.e. this is a ZSK, not a KSK). 
Make a note of the name of the file containing the new ZSK.

3. Take a look at your current DNSKEY RRSet.

  # dig MYTLD dnskey +multi

Your zone should contain one KSK and one ZSK (check the flags - 257/256 
- to distinguish between them).

We need to add the new key to the zone, so it gets included in the next
signing. At the end of the file /etc/bind/master/MYTLD, ADD the new key:

    $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+45000.key";

    Increment the serial number.

    Save the file and exit

4. Re-sign your zone to get the new ZSK signed, but we will NOT sign using
   the new ZSK - we only want the new ZSK to show up in the DNSKEY RRset 
   and be signed by the current KSK.
   This is called a "pre publish".

  # cd /etc/bind/keys
  # dnssec-signzone -x -o MYTLD -k KMYTLD.+008+52159 ../master/MYTLD KMYTLD.+008+51333

   (key tag numbers from the manual signing example)

  Notice in the above example that we are only using the current (old) ZSK
  and old KSK to sign, not the new one - this is to make sure that dnssec-signzone
  doesn't try to sign with both ZSKs. It wouldn't be "bad", but it would
  mean twice the data in the zone!

  So we tell dnssec-signzone exactly which keys to use when doing a 
  rollover, PRECISELY because you want to control the timing of when
  a key is introduced, used to sign, and finally retired.

  The output of the above command should be:

Zone signing complete:
Algorithm: RSASHA256: KSKs: 1 active, 0 stand-by, 0 revoked
                      ZSKs: 1 active, 1 present, 0 revoked
../master/MYTLD.signed

  Notice the ZSKs: 1 active, 1 present

5. See what difference this has made to the zone.

  # rndc reload MYTLD

  # dig @10.192.X.1 MYTLD dnskey +multi
  # dig @10.192.X.1 MYTLD dnskey +dnssec +multi
  # dig @10.192.X.1 MYTLD soa +dnssec

  (you could also check if your slaves have updated their serial)

Your zone should now contain one KSK and two ZSKs; both ZSKs should be
present in the DNSKEY RRSet, which should be signed by the KSK.

BUT the SOA record (and other RRSets in the zone) should ONLY be signed 
once, using the old ZSK. And the DNSKEY RRset should show all 3 keys 
(1 KSK, 2 ZSKs).

This is called "pre-publish".

At this time, we should in principle wait 2 x TTL for both ZSKs to
show up in everyone's cache (by default it is 120 seconds, or 2 minutes,
in our lab, but this will be different "in real life"). Anyways, let's 
wait for at least 2 minutes before we sign with the new ZSK instead of the
old ZSK.

After 2 minutes, ask one of your neighbors if they can lookup the DNSKEY
for your domain. They can check the in-class cache (10.192.0.230) and,
if they have configured it, their own caching resolver.

Again, the command to lookup the keys is:

  # dig MYTLD dnskey +multi

Once we are certain that "all the internet" (everyone in the class)
can see both keys, we can sign with the new ZSK.

6. Sign with the new ZSK.

   Remember, we have 3 keys - in our zone, we have:

   $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+52159.key"; // KSK
   $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+51333.key"; // ZSK we retire
   $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+45000.key"; // new ZSK

   Dont change any of these.

   But increment the serial number. Then:

   # cd /etc/bind/keys
   # dnssec-signzone -x -o MYTLD -k KMYTLD.+008+52159 ../master/MYTLD KMYTLD.+008+45000

... Notice how we now use 45000 (second ZSK) to sign, not 51333 anymore

Now, reload the zone to propagage the changes

   # rndc reload MYTLD

Check with dig like in step 5 that you are seeing only ONE signature 
for your RRsets - which means we are only signing using ONE ZSK - 
you still have to wait for the TTL to expire before you can retire 
the old ZSK.


7. Now you should notice, using dig like in step 5, that we are only
   signing with one key

   # dig @10.192.X.1 www.MYTLD +dnssec

But also verify that the OLD ZSK is still published in the DNSKEY RRset:

   # dig @10.192.X.1 MYTLD dnskey +multi

You should still see three keys.

After 2 minutes you should still see the AD bit set for

   # dig MYTLD SOA +dnssec

which indicates that during this rollover, the zone continues to validate
and thus security preserved.

8. Retire the old ZSK.

After waiting at least 2 minutes (120s) for caches to clear, retire 
the old ZSK:

  # cd /etc/bind/master/

  Edit the zone file and add a comment sign (';') in front of the old ZSK
  (double check which key!)

$include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+52159.key";  // KSK
; $include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+51333.key"; // ZSK (commented out)
$include "/etc/bind/keys/KMYTLD.+008+45000.key";  // new ZSK

  Increment the serial number.

  Now resign the zone, but you will notice that we explicitly 
  DON'T specify the ZSK we just commented:

  # cd /etc/bind/keys
  # dnssec-signzone -x -o MYTLD -k KMYTLD.+008+52159 ../master/MYTLD
  # rndc reload MYTLD
  # tail /etc/bind/log/general

9. Like in the step 5, check that signatures still work, and that
   the OLD KZK is no longer in the RRset

   Also, check the RRSIGs (dig +dnssec soa MYTLD) in your zone show the
   key ID of the new ZSK.

   Does your domain still work ? :)